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On Living Together in North America:
Canada, the United States and
International
Environmental Relations
JOHN E. CARROLL*
NEWELL B. MACK*"
"If it works, don't fix it." This excellent advice no longer applies to
the mechanisms used in resolving environmental disputes between Ca-
nada and the United States. Those mechanisms no longer work. They
need to be "fixed." This paper contends that: (1) Canadian-U.S. environ-
mental problems are currently resolved on an ad hoc basis; (2) the conse-
quences of continuing this ad hoc approach are not attractive; (3) there
are alternative ways to conduct Canadian-U.S. environmental relations; it
is feasible (4) to choose an alternative approach and (5) to implement it.
I. THE PROBLEM: THE AD Hoc APPROACH
Canada's relationship with the United States, from the late eight-
eenth and continuing into the nineteenth centuries, was marred by inter-
mittent war and Canadian fear of annexation.' During the first three
quarters of the twentieth century the relationship changed to one of close
friendship and cooperation. Until recently this mutual respect had en-
dured despite Canadian resentment of the elephant-and-mouse relation-
ship resulting from the great disparity in the sizes of the two countries'
populations, and Canadian concerns over preservation of its economic
self-determination and separate identity.
In the 1970's, however, a new factor entered the relationship: trans-
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boundary environmental problems. Environmental disputes are inevitable
between two nations which share a long boundary and large continental
"commons": air masses, rivers, the Great Lakes, and three oceans. Past
disputes, such as disagreements over the Skagit-High Ross Dam 2 the
Poplar power plant,8 and the Eastport oil refinery," have been relatively
minor. Though still unresolved, these problems are now overshadowed by
much more serious issues such as acid precipitation, toxics in the Great
Lakes, and the environmental and fisheries ramifications of the develop-
ment and transport of oil and gas found in the Arctic and offshore.5 Seri-
ous environmental problems now affect vast regions, major industries,
hundreds of thousands of people, and significant sectors of the economies
of both nations.' These problems pose a greater threat to Canadian-U.S.
relations than any other difficulties experienced in recent history.
In the past the two nations have handled environmental problems by
reaching temporary accomodations; they have not agreed on rules of be-
havior. Their environmental relationship is thus founded on a series of ad
hoc arrangements, in contrast with a problem-solving approach based
upon commonly shared principles and guiding rules. This ad hoc ap-
proach is the key problem in the environmental relationship.
Admittedly, there have been some steps toward establishing princi-
ples to guide the relationship. (See Figure 1 below).
(Figure 1)
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2. The Skagit-High Ros Dam is a large hydroelectric dam in the State of Washington
which backs water into Canada in order to generate cheap electricity for Seattle. A current
proposal calls for increasing the height of the dam (to generate additional electricity) thus
further inundating Canadian acreage. J. CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: AN EXAMINA-
TION AND PROSPEcrivE op CANADIAN-U.S. ENvIRONMENTAL RELATIONS (1982) (to be published
in 1983 by University of Michigan Press.)[hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY].
3. The Poplar power plant is a partially completed electrical production facility located
in Saskatchewan a few miles from the Montana border. It has water apportionment, water
quality and air quality impacts on the State of Montana. Id.
4. The Eastport oil refinery issue concerns a U.S. proposal to build a large oil refinery,
on the Maine-New Brunswick border, which would require large oil-carrying supertankers to
pass through dangerous and disputed boundary waters. A very large Canadian fishery is
threatened. Id.
5. For a comprehensive treatment of all the major transboundary environmental
problems involving the United States and Canada, see ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2
supra.
6. See John Carroll's study of the role of acid rain in Canada-U.S. relations: J. CAR-
ROLL, ACID RAN: AN ISSUE IN CANADIAN-AMERuCAN RELATiONS (1982)(published by the Na-
tional Planning Association, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as ACID RAIN].
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The Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the
United States and Canada7 (Boundary Waters Treaty) does define
"boundary waters" and establishes priorities for using certain of the
boundary and near-boundary waters.' It also specifies that the rights of
the upstream nation may not be abridged so long as the downstream na-
tion is not deprived of reasonable use of water.10 This philosophy was
expressed in the Harmon Doctrine" and promoted by the U.S. team
which negotiated the Treaty. Further, the Boundary Waters Treaty es-
tablished the International Joint Commission (I.J.C. or Commission),
which issues rule-making procedural orders."2
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 19721 and 1978,"
while not establishing binding rules, do introduce principles guiding joint
monitoring and research in the Great Lakes ecosystem, as well as goals
for improving the Lakes' water quality and for allocating certain proper-
ties of the Great Lakes, such as sewage dilution.
Principles-but clearly not binding rules-emerged from negotiations
on the Poplar power plant issue. These principles were reflected in the
bilateral agreement to monitor jointly the air and water quality of the
Poplar River.' 5 Other principles emerged from negotiations over the
7. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States
and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [herein-
after cited as Boundary Waters Treaty].
8. Id. preliminary art. Boundary waters are defined as those along which an interna-
tional boundary runs. Also included are those waters which are upstream from and flow
across the boundary, waters tributary to boundary waters, those waters which flow from
boundary waters, and waters which are downstream from the boundary, having flowed
across it.
9. Id. art. VIII.
10. Id. art. II.
11. Named after former Attorney General Judson Harmon, the Harmon Doctrine es-
pouses the sovereignty of each state to do as it wills with water on its side of the border. In
practice it favors the United States, which is more often than Canada the upstream nation
on important transboundary rivers. For a detailed explanation of the Harmon Doctrine, see
ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2 supra.
12. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, at arts. VII-X. The International Joint
Commission [hereinafter cited as I.J.C.J was established by the Boundary Waters Treaty to
adjudicate certain disputes over boundary waters apportionment and to make recommenda-
tions about other matters involving boundary waters and air when requested by the two
federal governments. Id. art. VII.
13. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada, 23
U.S.T. 1301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312. This Agreement was an executive agreement to work jointly
on monitoring and research of Great Lakes water pollution, and to make recommendations
to both governments on needed action. The agreement was renewed in 1978.
14. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30
U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
15. Ad hoc agreement, reached through an exchange of diplomatic notes, to establish a
committee of federal, state and provincial representatives. The committee is to monitor the
impact on air and water quality in Montana and Saskatchewan arising from the Poplar
River power plant located in Saskatchewan. ENvraoNmuwrAL DIPOMACY, note 2 supra.
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Cabin Creek-Flathead River coal mine dispute's and were reflected in the
formation of a bilateral committee for information exchange. Similar
principles have been proposed for resolving other issues, such as those
concerning Champlain-Richelieu flooding.' However, except for certain
very limited water apportionment provisions of the Boundary Waters
Treaty, none of these agreements is binding. Both nations frequently ig-
nore their spirit, if not their letter. Further, these agreements do not, by
any reasonable definition of the term, establish rules for behavior. They
merely temper the customary ad hoc approach.
The assertion that the current approach is to consider each case on
an ad hoc basis is dramatically supported by the fact that there are virtu-
ally no institutions which deal with Canadian-U.S. environmental rela-
tions. Aside from the Departments of State and External Affairs, the en-
tire bureaucracy consists of the I.J.C. The I.J.C. is composed of six
Commissioners assisted by small staffs in Washington and Ottawa (total-
ing less than thirty-five people) and by the Great Lakes regional field
staff in Windsor, Ontario, which is restricted to performing functions
specified in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 8 The only other
apparent bureaucracies are in fact examples of informal "ad hockery"
rather than formal institutionalization. These bureaucracies are the tech-
nical working groups created by the Memorandum of Intent on Trans-
boundary Air Pollution (Memorandum of Intent), 9 and the monitoring
committees established to defuse a few of the border issues, notably the
Poplar, Cabin Creek and the St. John River issues. None of these com-
mittees has any full-time or even part-time personnel of its own; the
staffs are composed of individuals borrowed from federal, provincial and
state agencies. The environmental relationship has not yet become suffi-
ciently formalized to require permanent full-time institutional structures.
Satisfactory diplomatic settlement of disputes using the ad hoc ap-
proach has been achieved only in the few cases where water apportion-
ment and priority of use, for which rule making is mandated in the
Boundary Waters Treaty, were central issues. Examples of such disputes
include those concerning Lake of the Woods,"0 Milk River or Sage Creek"2
16. The Cabin Creek-Flathead issue involves a proposed British Columbia coal mine
which would have an impact on the wilderness values of northwestern Montana and Glacier
National Park. A bilateral committee for information exchange has been established to deal
with this problem. Id.
17. The Champlain-Richelieu issue involves the flooding of the flat Richelieu River Val-
ley of Quebec by the high waters of Vermont's Lake Champlain and the effort of Quebec to
manipulate artificially the levels of those waters at some ecological cost to Vermont. Id.
18. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, 1978-79 Annual Report (Ottawa and Washington, D.C. 1979).
19. Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, United
States-Canada, T.I.A.S. No. 9856. In the Memorandum, both federal governments pledged
to act to stem the flow of air pollutants moving across the international border. Sulfur diox-
ide and nitrogen oxides, the precursors of acid rain, were the targets. The Memorandum also
committed the two governments to negotiate a bilateral air quality agreement.
20. Lake of the Woods is a boundary water at the juncture of Minnesota, Ontario and
Manitoba whose usage is managed under a 1912 bilateral agreement. INT'L JOINT COMM'N,
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and the single case where forced arbitration was used: the Trail Smelter
Arbitration." In addition, the Milk River decision, after many years of
acceptance, now shows signs of coming apart.2 3
The ad hoc approach has failed to resolve the Skagit-High Ross Dam
dispute for over two decades and the Garrison irrigation dispute2 4 for
nearly a decade. It has prolonged by years the resolution of other bilateral
environmental problems. Most of these issues will remain unresolved and
others, such as the Dickey-Lincoln Dam issue, will be resolved only for
domestic reasons,2 5 or will be accepted as accomplished facts for which
damage compensation claims will be made.
The ad hoc approach has, thus far, generally failed to resolve bilat-
eral disputes. Yet these disputes have been minor compared with the
transboundary environmental issues which are now developing. If small
problems have not been satisfactorily handled through the ad hoc ap-
proach, one can hardly expect to resolve present and future disputes con-
cerning toxic substances in the Great Lakes, or acid rain, by resorting to
the ad hoc method. What would be the consequences of continuing to
make ad hoc decisions when confronted with these far more serious
challenges?
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUED AD Hoc DECISION MAKING
Future decisions about the environment can be made in a number of
ways. The two nations can continue to make ad hoc decisions, treating
each issue without regard to any formalized "rules" for behavior. Or, they
can agree to "rules" for future behavior, and base their decisions on those
"rules." The authors use the word "rules" loosely, to include the entire
spectrum from guidelines for procedure to formal procedures rigidly
enforced.
This section discusses the consequences of continuing to make deci-
Docket 3R (Ottawa and Washington, D.C., 1912).
21. Milk River and Sage Creek are tranaboundary rivers along the Montana-Alberta
border which have been the subject of apportionment disputes regarding irrigation usage. In
1946 the I.J.C. reached a decision on this issue. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, Docket 53R (Ottawa
and Washington, D.C., 1946).
22. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905
(1949); reprinted in 35 AM J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
23. Earlier I.J.C. apportionment decisions may be threatened by local pressure from
irrigators in Alberta on the Alberta Government to construct a new dam in the area in
reaction to increasing Montana irrigation demand.
24. Garrison is a controversial irrigation project in North Dakota which would seriously
impact water quality and commercial fisheries in Manitoba. See J. CARROLL & R. LOGAN,
THE GARRISON DIVERSION UNIT. A CASE STUDY IN CANADIAN-U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS
(published by the C.D. Howe Research Institute, Montreal and the National Planning Ass'n,
Washington, D.C., 1980).
25. Dickey-Lincoln was a proposed hydroelectric dam in northern Maine which would
have flooded valuable forest land in Quebec. The project has been blocked by the U.S. Con-
gress. See ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2 supra.
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sions in the absence of rules. The next section discusses the consequences
of decision making based on rules, and compares some of the results of
these two very different decision-making methods.
Any decision has consequences for several groups of people who en-
joy-or suffer-its outcome. In Canadian-U.S. environmental decisions
these groups are commonly industries, governments, and "environmental-
ists"-those citizens concerned more with environmental consequences
than with immediate economic consequences. The political energies of
these groups are channeled through the media and finally come to bear
on officials representing the several levels of government-notably diplo-
mats responsible only to the two federal governments.
The diplomats face a four-tier dilemma in attempting to resolve an
issue. First, the actors may not agree on what criteria-for example eco-
nomic, political or environmental criteria-are to be used to assess the
consequences of a decision (Table 1).
Table I
A Few of the Criteria for Resolving a
Transboundary Environmental Issue
Are all the benefits and costs counted: health, environmental, economic,
etc.?
Do the total benefits exceed the total costs?
Are the costs and benefits justly distributed among those affected by the
decision?
Does the decision contribute to the predictability of future decisions?
Can the decision, once reached, be administered?
Is the decision politically acceptable to the major actors?
Second, even if the actors agree on assessment criteria, they may dis-
agree over which raw data to assess. A classic example of this is the disa-
greement between scientists employed by coal-fired power plants and
scientists representing environmental groups over the effects of acid rain.
Third, even if all sides agree on the scientific data, each may weigh the
data very differently. The aesthetic and monetary value of an oil-fouled
duck is measured differently by the worker who drilled for the oil, the
utility whose tanker spilled the oil, the environmentalist who cleansed the
bird, and the consumer who pays for the oil. Fourth, even if none of the
above problems arises in a dispute, the disagreement is not resolved solely
on its merits, in isolation from other factors. The decision is influenced by
the larger political and economic context within which a single issue is
decided.
The ad hoc approach, it must be admitted, has some advantages. It
provides flexibility for diplomats, enabling them to respond to changes in
VOL. 12:1
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political leadership and policy direction at all levels of government. It
also permits the diplomatic practice of issue "linkage," though diplomats
often deny that they use this practice.2"
The advantages of the ad hoc approach are overshadowed by its
costs. Perhaps the greatest cost in using this approach is a loss of predict-
ability. "Ad hockery" provides no certainty as to how an issue will be
handled in the future. Each issue is disposed of separately, often in a
heated and emotional atmosphere generated by the media. All interested
parties can exert pressure and influence for any purpose and issues are
resolved in ways which achieve narrow ends without weighing broader
considerations.. Ths cost of not resolving disputes under agreed-upon
rules is the loss of a predictable, orderly resolution acceptable to the ma-
jority of those involved. Under an ad hoc approach, each party to the
dispute is a potential loser. Businesses suffer the increased cost of unpre-
dictability, an economic threat to their long-term investments. Local
governments find it more difficult to protect long-term property values.
Environmentalists lose the chance to develop rules and regulations which
might protect the environment in future disputes. Additionally, the citi-
zens of both nations suffer the costs of worsened diplomatic relations, for
foreign relations failures are foreign relations costs, even if rarely mea-
sured in the calculus of cost-benefit ratios.
In the present state of Canadian-U.S. environmental relations, the
value of "ad hockery" and its inherent flexibility may well have run its
course. The consequences of continuing the present ad hoc approach are
not desirable. The two nations may well have more to gain by adopting a
more structurally ordered system.
III. ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
Canadians and Americans need not suffer the consequences of ad hoc
accomodations. They can instead adopt alternative methods of dealing
with transboundary environmental issues. In brief, they can agree upon
rules of conduct. A few options for those rules, and for the agreement,
follow. Rules governing the "input" to the decision-making process-what
environmental issues will be considered and when-and the "output" of
the process-studies or recommendations or enforced decisions-are con-
sidered first. Then possible forms for the agreement-memorandum of
understanding, treaty, etc.,-are examined.
A matrix of alternative agreements on rules of behavior is shown in
Figure 2. The rules agreed upon by the two nations are shown in the hori-
zontal rows of Figure 2. Several options for the form of the agreement
establishing those rules appear in the vertical columns. A single form of
agreement-equivalent to choosing a single vertical column in Figure
2-is not necessary. There could be, for example, a treaty on monitoring
26. Issue linkage is the deliberate conditioning, by diplomats, of progress on one issue
in return for progress on another (perhaps unrelated) issue.
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and a memorandum of understanding on enforcement (heavy rectangles
in Figure 2). The rules and agreements of Figure 2 might apply primarily
to one aspect of the environment, as in the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, or to several aspects. Figure 2 can thus be thought of as a
two-dimensional slice through a three-dimensional cube-much as many
slices of bread make up a loaf. (Figure 3).
Figure 2
B. FORM OF AGENT AGREEMENT
AGREEMENTTB.FR FAGREEMENT
A. RULES A R E E M E NT  hoc) ExecutiveofAGREED Under- Protocols Agree- TreatyUPON standing ments
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A. Rules Agreed Upon
1. Input
What issues will be considered, when, under the agreement? Virtu-
ally all transboundary environmental issues can be the subject of an
agreement because at present there are almost no mandatory rules to
guide their resolution. The quantitative apportionment of water is one
exception, for it is governed by the Boundary Waters Treaty.2 7 But there
are no mandatory rules covering water quality or air quality. Other issues
have received little or no attention: groundwater, soil contamination, acid
rain and projects with "long distance" impacts that arise at points in one
nation far from its border and have effects deep within the other nation.
Such issues obviously could be dealt with in any agreement.
When should a development with transboundary impact be consid-
ered as an "issue?" Whatever the form of agreement, it must specify a
"trigger" indicating when the issue has become sufficiently important to
warrant attention. This question of timing is addressed in the Boundary
Waters Treaty. Before a party can use boundary waters it must file an
application with the I.J.C. The filing of the application sets certain proce-
dures in motion. If a party from one nation should violate the treaty by
attempting to appropriate boundary waters without filing an application,
the other nation can insist that an application be filed, thus triggering the
procedural response and so bringing agreed upon rules into play.2
What degree of environmental damage should trigger action? For
some environmental issues no answer is found in the federal law of either
nation, nor in state or provincial law. For other issues answers are found
in the laws of some or all of the four jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the
answers differ. Should violation of the law of only one jurisdiction trigger
action, or should more-perhaps all four laws-be violated before the
mechanism is triggered? An answer may gradually emerge as the govern-
ments adopt increasingly uniform standards.
2. Output
Once an issue has been taken up by a decision-making mechanism,
what rules govern the Canadian-U.S. response? Does the mechanism
merely monitor the problem, or make recommendations on how to deal
with it, or does it have authority to enforce its recommendations? Merely
to illustrate various degrees of authority for implementing action, three
options are considered: joint monitoring, research and reporting only; ad-
vice and recommendations; and enforcement.
Joint monitoring, research and reporting are essential. Gathering
data which both nations agree are reliable is a major step toward resolv-
27. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 7, at art. VIII.
28. Id.
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ing bilateral problems. Reaching accord on the interpretation of the data
is more difficult. Agreement on the data and their interpretation is more
likely if monitoring and research are carried out jointly by the two na-
tions. Scientific cooperation is the easiest type of joint effort to achieve;
its importance is much more than symbolic. It is in this area that the
I.J.C. has achieved an admirable record over many years.29 Whether or
not the two nations choose to move beyond this level, they must at least
work to achieve accord on scientific facts and their interpretation.
Formulation of advice and recommendations carries the process a
step further. The I.J.C. has reached the stage of making recommenda-
tions, but there are limits to what the I.J.C. can do. As the U.S. State
Department and the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs control the
flow of work to the Commission, 0 they can easily prevent the Commis-
sion from making recommendations on controversial matters. If a recom-
mendation which differs from diplomatic views is made public it can
threaten diplomatic maneuvering because the diplomats must then op-
pose the advice of an independent body. There is clearly a range of
choices as to how broadly recommendations should be publicized.
Enforcement can be carried out under binding authority which is
limited or broad. The I.J.C. exerts limited binding authority, although on
a very restricted basis. The question hindering any agreement will be:
How "limited" is this authority? The precise breadth of this limited bind-
ing authority will determine how easy it will be to achieve agreement. The
option of broad binding authority is more difficult to achieve, but more
effective than weaker options. An extreme example of the use of broad
binding authority is a high arbitral tribunal composed of three or five
distinguished citizens of the two countries who would carefully weigh
each issue and whose findings could not be appealed. The impossibility of
appeal would ensure termination and, by definition, bilateral resolution of
the issue-though not necessarily the satisfaction of all parties involved
in the judgment.
There clearly are numerous options for rules the two nations could
follow in order to predict each other's behavior and to avert or resolve
transboundary conflicts (horizontal rows in Figure 2). There are also nu-
merous options for a formal agreement establishing these rules (vertical
columns in Figure 2).
B. The Form of Agreement
Four possible vehicles for codifying rules of conduct, each involving a
different degree of stringency, are: (1) a memorandum of understanding;
(2) protocols to the existing Boundary Waters Treaty; (3) an executive
agreement; and (4) a treaty.
29. ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2 supra.
30. Id.
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A memorandum of understanding has symbolic benefits, but it is
very weak and in the past has not really influenced behavior. The Cana-
dian-U.S. Memorandum of Intent concerning the long-range cross-border
transport of air pollutants is a case in point: it influenced behavior in
Canada but was largely ignored in the United States.3' The Michigan-
Ontario Memorandum of Understanding on Air Pollution, signed about a
decade ago, has also proven ineffective.33 The symbolic value of these ges-
tures is real, but may not be followed by concrete action.
The alternative of writing protocols to the existing Boundary Waters
Treaty could conceivably have the reverse outcome: action without sym-
bolism. Such protocols would probably not be highly publicized, and so
would lack symbolic value, but could produce genuinely effective action.
This alternative deserves study because quiet action is needed, similar to
the diplomacy practiced by outstanding Canadian and American diplo-
mats of the 1950's and 1960's such as Arnold Heeney and Livingston
Merchant.83
An executive agreement has value but must not be overrated. Despite
all the attention given to the two Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements,
there is little in them that is binding.3' They have had mixed results, and
are often threatened with crisis as during the Nixon impoundment of ap-
propriated funds of a decade ago, or today's severe Reagan Administra-
tion budget cuts." The spirit in which the letter of these agreements has
been administered leaves much to be desired. It is questionable whether
an executive agreement can produce rules for, and garner the support of,
all the border states and provinces and the legislative and executive
branches of both federal governments.
The treaty approach presents the greatest challenge and promises the
greatest reward. The approval of a treaty is a long and involved process.
Public awareness can be generated by the national debate which precedes
31. Acm RAIN, note 6 supra.
32. The Michigan-Ontario Memorandum of Understanding on Air Pollution was an
agreement between the state and the province to seek reduction in air pollutants crossing
the border. It was focused on the Detroit-Windsor area. Neither the memorandum nor the
I.J.C. study concerning Detroit-Windsor and Sarnia-Port Huron tranaborder air pollution is
binding. Given the very high economic stakes, there has been little incentive for them to be
anything but symbolic. EIRONmENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2 supra.
33. Arnold Heeney was Canadian Ambassador to the United States on two occasions in
the 1940's and 1950's. He was also Canadian Chairman of the I.J.C. Livingston Merchant
was a career U.S. diplomat who saw a number of Canadian assignments.
34. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements are executive agreements rather than
treaties and are not enforceable. Their success depends on goodwill. ENVRONMENTAL DEPLO-
MAcy, note 2 supra.
35. The effects of the Nixon Administration impoundment of congressionally appropri-
ated dollars destined for Great Lakes pollution cleanup, and the Reagan Administration
reduction of the Environmental Protection Agency's budget, are so substantial as to cast
doubt on the willingness of the United States to honor its commitment to Canada under the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978, and perhaps also under the Mem-
orandum of Intent.
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a treaty's ratification. The rigor of a treaty can assure the cooperation of
all levels of government.
These options for rules and agreements generate a broad range of
alternatives to the current ad hoc style of decision making. Each option,
if adopted, would yield a different set of consequences. The question is
whether the two nations will adopt one of these alternatives-and thus its
consequences-or instead maintain the status quo.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: A TRIBUNAL ON TRIAL
The choice which faces Canada and the United States is one between
the perpetuation of ad hoc decision making, or the adoption of some
other method of managing transboundary environmental problems. For
the moment the two nations have not yet made that choice and so con-
tinue to feel the consequences of ad hoc decisions. If another method is
adopted it will probably be chosen only because-and when-it becomes
politically more expensive to maintain the status quo than to shift to a
different way of handling disputes. In particular, no shift will be made
until the constituencies who have a stake in transboundary mat-
ters-namely corporations, environmentalists, government officials of
towns near the border, etc.-feel an impact and as a result start to press
for a change. This birth of political will, should it occur, will be one con-
sequence of maintaining the status quo. Other results of continuing to
make ad hoc decisions have been discussed in section II.
The constituency, such as environmentalists, which first presses for
change will seek that alternative to "ad hockery" which best suits its in-
terests. The search will provoke reactions from other constituencies, such
as corporations which, dissatisfied with the environmentalists' proposal,
will propose an alternative more cordial to their own corporate interests.
The debate will then no longer be over whether to continue ad hoc deci-
sion making or to agree to rules. Rather, it will be over whose rules will be
selected. Views will differ on which environmental issues should be con-
sidered and when, and on what rules should govern the joint Canadian-
U.S. response. Theoretically, the choices could be based on abstract and
tidy criteria for deciding transboundary issues (Table I). In fact, the deci-
sion will likely be the outcome of a political tug-of-war, with each constit-
uency using those criteria which advance its case.
The need to deal with environmental problems in a politically realis-
tic context suggests the desirability of an instrument with binding au-
thority in some carefully defined areas, but which also recognizes other
areas where action would consist merely of advice and recommendations.
(Table II).
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Table II
Simplified Summary of Shifts of Functions From National Toward
International Jurisdiction
ARRANGEMENT
FUNCTION
Unilateral
(all levels
of govern-
ment)
Informal Cooperation
Federal/ Federal/State
Federal Provincial
"Early Warning"
research
monitoring for
research
data base &
analysis
prior notice
"Assessment"
consultation
impact assessment
"Enforcement"
standard setting
monitoring for
enforcement
enforcement
conflict resolution
0 [1] .JX
o 0 [2]-*X
0 X
0 X
0 -X
0
0
0
0
0
Legend 0 = existing
X = proposed
1 = IJC included under Federal-Federal Cooperation (and
not Treaty column)
2 = Michigan-Ontario Transboundary Air Pollution
Committee
Source: H. SEIGMANN, RESPONSES TO TRANSFRONTIER AIR POLLUTION:
THE CANADIAN-U.S. CASE (Program on Int'l Envtl. Issues,
Center for Int'l Studies, Publication C/79-13, M.I.T., Nov.
1979).
Bilateral
Federal/
Federal
Agreement
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With experience gathered over time, a satisfactory balance between au-
thority and advice could eventually be reached. Ideally, however, the area
of binding authority should be broader than the very narrow authority
presently granted to the I.J.C. 3s
Given the numerous options, and the complex political forces which
will generate the actual outcome, any recommendation is quite arbitrary.
Nevertheless, the authors propose an experiment with the concept of
broad binding authority: an arbitral tribunal should be established for a
trial period of perhaps ten years. At the end of that time, the tribunal
would be evaluated and then abolished or permanently or temporarily re-
newed. Such a tribunal could be established by executive agreement. Ef-
forts toward treaty formulation should begin simultaneously, with imple-
mentation of a treaty by the end of the ten-year period as the goal. This
trial period would allow sufficient time for approval of the treaty, includ-
ing ratification by the U.S. Senate. An experiment seems desirable be-
cause political realities currently prevent a long-term commitment to for-
mulation of a tribunal. The precise characteristics of a tribunal are less
important than the fact-and this is the point to stress-that such a tri-
bunal would be an experiment.
Let us examine the tribunal concept following the outline of Figure 2.
The tribunal could consider any environmental issue when raised by ei-
ther federal government.37 It would enforce its decisions through broad
binding authority. Its decisions could not be appealed. At the end of the
trial period, or after one or more renewals of the trial period, the tribunal
would be established by treaty.
The three or five members of the tribunal would be distinguished
citizens appointed by each country's executive branch and approved by
its legislature. They would serve for a single term of long and fixed dura-
tion, perhaps one or two decades, and on retirement would receive a gen-
erous lifetime pension. The long fixed term and large pension would serve
to provide some of the same independence and protection from the buf-
feting of political winds that is enjoyed by United States Supreme Court
Justices.
Many of the other options have been tried, and each has had short-
comings. If Canadians and Americans wish to resolve environmental con-
flicts, they may be willing to experiment with a method which appears to
offer great long-term benefits, despite the challenges to be overcome.
Should the attempt not succeed, it would automatically terminate after a
specified period of time. Should the tribunal be abolished, the two na-
tions would be no worse off and would have made a good faith effort.
36. The authority of the I.J.C. is narrow; it is limited only to apportionment of bound-
ary waters under a restricted set of circumstances. ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, note 2
supra.
37. The letter of the Boundary Waters Treaty currently allows either country to send a
reference to the I.J.C. In practice, references come from both countries simultaneously.
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Regardless of its outcome, the experiment would benefit both peoples.
V. IMPLEMENTATION: BUILDING THE CONSTITUENCY
Implementation of the tribunal experiment can be sought through an
age-old technique: linking a goal with the self-interests of those people
who have the power to achieve it. This method entails identifying those
who have the power to accomplish a goal, and then demonstrating how,
by achieving it, they can advance their self-interests.
The constituencies with the most to gain from a tribunal are the cor-
porate community, the citizen environmentalist community, and local
governments near the national borders. Corporations make long-term in-
vestments, and thus gain from steps which reduce uncertainty about the
future. Even disadvantageous regulations, if they can be guaranteed not
to change for a decade or so, may be preferred to a shifting regulatory
climate in which today's investment in pollution control becomes to-
morrow's wasted effort. This is especially true in the management of long-
term, large-scale endeavors, such as large energy projects. Citizen envi-
ronmentalists benefit from rules for environmental protection which give
environmentalists the legal recourse they now lack. Local officials of
towns near the Canada-U.S. border obviously need to respond to the in-
terests of the residents of their towns and to protect their towns' long-
term investments and credit ratings. Established rules would permit long-
term planning for such local public concerns as groundwater protection,
pollution control and waste disposal.
These groups could take a concrete step toward forming a tribunal,
or some other mechanism for dispute resolution, by meeting periodically
to seek points of intersection between their interests and the goal of im-
proved environmental relations. An informal group of industrialists, gov-
ernment officials and environmentalists might well be able to formulate
the outlines of a bilateral agreement more easily than could diplomats.
After a framework had been devised, attempts could be made to consult
with, and seek the support of, a broader constituency. Eventually one
would hope to gain the support of legislative committees such as the U.S.
Senate's committees on Foreign Relations and on Environment and Pub-
lic Works. Resolutions of support from either or both houses of the U.S.
Congress would be valuable. Resolutions by state legislatures, with resul-
tant pressure on U.S. senators, should also ease the way toward Senate
ratification of a treaty. Only the willingness of the national governments
to support such a tribunal, preferably with the support of provincial and
state governments, could bring it into being.
The rules may be opposed by people who fear that they will lose
profits, flexibility or power. Perhaps opponents will come to accept the
view that improvement in bilateral relations not only reduces uncertainty
but produces other benefits, including opportunities for the two nations
to work jointly in areas such as energy, economic development, and envi-
ronmental research.
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Environmental relations within the North American community can
improve. Decisions about transboundary environmental issues need not
be ad hoc but can instead follow guidelines agreed to by both nations,
with disputes resolved by a mechanism such as a tribunal. The values
necessary for agreement exist. What has been lacking has been the will.
